The Supreme Court of Canada (the “Court”) has unanimously struck down a privative clause in the Conflict of Interest Act that attempted to bar judicial review of the Ethics Commissioner’s decisions on questions of fact and law. In Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 28, the Court held that the Constitution guarantees a minimum of legality review over all administrative decisions, and that this guarantee cannot be legislated away.

The implications of this decision extend well beyond the Ethics Commissioner. Any statute containing a privative clause, a common feature of labour relations, workers’ compensation, and immigration legislation, may now be vulnerable to challenge.

Administrative decision-makers, policy drafters, and the lawyers who advise them should take note.

Background and facts: How a WE Charity funding decision led to a constitutional challenge

In 2020, two members of Parliament requested that the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) examine whether then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau had contravened the Conflict of Interest Act (the “Act”). The request arose from his involvement in decisions concerning the funding of WE Charity. In 2021, the Commissioner issued a report concluding that Prime Minister Trudeau had not contravened the Act (the “Report”).

Democracy Watch, a national citizen advocacy organization, applied to the Federal Court of Appeal for judicial review of the Report. Democracy Watch argued that the Commissioner had made errors of both fact and law in the Report.  The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to strike the application, in reliance on the partial privative clause contained in Section 66 of the Act, which states as follows:

Orders and decisions final

66 Every order and decision of the Commissioner is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court, except in accordance with the Federal Courts Act on the grounds referred to in paragraph 18.1(4)(a), (b) or (e) of that Act.[1]

Section 66 of the Act was considered a partial privative clause as there was a narrow carve out to permit a review of decisions in accordance with the Federal Courts Act (“FCA”). The potential review under the FCA was limited to subsections 18.1(4)(a), (b), or (e) therein, which allowed for a review for issues of jurisdiction, breach of natural justice, procedural fairness, or, for an error of law.[2] Therefore, while section 66 of the Act still aimed to limit reviews of the administrative decisions, the carve out under the FCA resulted in the clause only being a partial privative clause, instead of full.

The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the motion and dismissed Democracy Watch’s application. Democracy Watch appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

What did the Supreme Court decide?

The Court unanimously allowed Democracy Watch’s appeal. Chief Justice Wagner, writing for the Court, held that the Constitution Act, 1867 guarantees a core minimum of legality review over administrative decisions. It was further established that this guarantee cannot be legislated away. Section 66 of the Act was determined to infringe on the constitutional guarantee for the availability of judicial review and was thereby found to be of no force and effect. Last, the Court held that there was no adequate alternative remedy available to Democracy Watch. Each of the Court’s main findings and analysis are further described below.

i. Considerations for judicial review

Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 entrenches judicial review for legality as a necessary role of the courts. Legislation which exceeds the boundaries of its own jurisdiction may be subject to judicial review.

The constitutional protection for judicial review requires the courts to ask if, when properly interpreted, the clause has the effect of ousting judicial review for any aspect of an administrative decision. Legislatures can set out timelines for judicial review or give guidelines for how judicial review may be considered on its merits. It cannot, however, oust the right to judicial review in its entirety.

It was found by the Court that Section 66 of the Act, which claims that “every order and decision of the Commissioner is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court…” was found to be an attempt to limit judicial review.[3] As such, the Court invalidated the clause.[4]

ii. Privative clauses in statutes

The Court further reviewed the history of privative clauses, which aim to shield administrative decisions from judicial review. The Court reiterated that any legislation seeking to fully bar an administrative decision from judicial review is not permitted.[5] However, the Attorney General, in arguing that certain limitations were permitted, cited Crevier v Attorney General of Quebec, [1981] 2 SCR 220 [Crevier],for the proposition that questions of fact and law could be barred.[6] This position was rejected by the Court.[7] Instead,  Crevier was to be read in its “historical context” while taking into account the advancements in the interpretation of the standards of review.[8]

On this basis and on further review of the historical context of privative clauses, the Court determined that privative clauses have evolved to have limited function.[9] While the legislative intent will still assist with the process, the privative clause itself will not be capable of removing judicial oversight.[10]

The Court did not go so far as to find that all privative clauses were unconstitutional or to constitutionally guarantee a minimum standard of review.[11] Instead, it was established that the Court’s ability to oversee the legality of administrative decision making was protected.[12] It therefore follows that any privative clause which would operate to limit the Court’s oversight function is at risk of being challenged.

iii. Alternative remedies

Courts are permitted to deny judicial review, on a discretionary basis, in circumstances where an acceptable alternative remedy exists.[13] An alternative remedy does not have a set form and the type of remedy can vary, but it must be adequate to provide oversight of the decision.[14] One example would be an independent appeal process that is set by the administrative body.

The Court found that the alternative remedy that was available to oversee the Commissioner’s decisions was inadequate.[15] The alternative remedy for the Commissioner came in the form of “political oversight” as an annual report needed to be presented to a Federal Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.[16] Given that this reported alternative did not actually provide a remedy to the party who took issue with the decision, it was found to be an insufficient alternative to judicial review by the Court.[17]

Key takeaways

Privative clauses in statutes may not be successful in safeguarding administrative decisions from judicial review. Decisions which would have previously been protected from judicial review by a privative clause may now be subject to review. Industries often found with governing legislation containing privative clauses include labour boards, workers’ compensation, and immigration. Organizations and tribunals relying on privative clauses in their governing legislation should assess whether those clauses remain enforceable in light of this decision.

Availability of adequate alternative remedies are a key consideration in determining whether a privative clause will be upheld.

If you have any questions about, or are facing an issue involving, privative clause(s), please contact a lawyer from Miller Thomson’s Commercial Litigation or Administrative and Public Law groups.

[1] Conflict of Interest Act, SC 2006, c 9, s.2, s 66.

[2] Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c, F-7, s 18(4)(a), (b) and (e).

[3] Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 28 at paras 85-88 [Democracy Watch].

[4] Ibid at para 88.

[5] Ibid at para 42.

[6] Crevier v Attorney General of Quebec, [1981] 2 SCR 220 [Crevier], cited in Democracy Watch, ibid at para 43.

[7] Ibid at para 44.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid at para 62.

[10]Ibid.

[11] Ibid at paras 69-71.

[12] Ibid at paras 71-72.

[13] Ibid at para 18.

[14] Strickland v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 37 at paras 42-45.

[15] Democracy Watch, supra note 3 at para 36.

[16] Ibid at para 22.

[17] Ibid at para 31.